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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States and Western Europe are facing an ongoing crisis of
conscience, policy, and identity as they grapple with an influx of refugees following
the Syrian Civil War. 1 This is in addition to long-standing questions of general
J.D. Candidate, University of Arizona, May 2019. I would like to thank Professor
Robert Glennon at the University of Arizona for his helpful feedback and discussion of this
topic. I would also like to thank my parents, Robert and Bonnie Green, and my brother,
Daniel, for their love and support over the course of my law school education. As with all
things, Soli Deo Gloria.
Lizzie Dearden, Syrian Civil War: More than Five Million Refugees Flee Conflict
as Global Support for Resettlement Wanes, THE INDEP., Mar. 30, 2017,
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immigration policy.2 The 2016 US Presidential Election was profoundly shaped
and determined in part by the most recent surge of anxiety over immigration levels
in the United States.3 Western European nations have similarly riven, particularly
over the question of admitting refugees from majority Muslim nations.4 While the
debates in the United Kingdom have not had the same energizing effect among
populist candidates that was present in the election of President Donald Trump,'
other European democracies have seen a substantial increase in support for populist
parties who champion lower immigration rates or ceasing refugee intake.6 While
none of these parties have seen the success that President Trump did as an individual
candidate, they have succeeded in shifting attitudes and policies toward
immigration protectionism as center-right parties seek to recapture lost voters who
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-civil-war-five-million-
refugees -conflict -resettlement -un-geneva-donald-trump-europe-migrant-a765 8606.html.
2 See generally James F. Smith, A Nation that Welcomes Immigrants? An Historical
Examination of United States Immigration Policy, 1 U.C. DAWis J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 227
(1995).
3 Matt Flegenheimer & Michael Barbaro, Donald Trump Is Elected President in
Stunning Repudiation of the Establishment, N.Y. TIMVES, Nov. 9, 2016,
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/09/us/politics/hillary-clinton-donald-trump-
president.html ("But not until these voters were offered a Republican who ran as an
unapologetic populist, railing against foreign trade deals and illegal immigration, did they
move so drastically away from their ancestral political home."); see, e.g., Exit Polls, CNN
(last updated Nov. 23, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/election/results/exit-polls (showing that
64% of Trump voters labelled immigration as the most important issue facing the country).
4 Migrant crisis: What is the UK Doing to Help?, BBC, Jan. 28, 2016,
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-34139960.
5 See General election 2017: Could UKIP's Immigration Policy Work?, BBC, May,
8, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-39847685 (discussing UKIP's plan for net-
zero migration in Britain); Robert Booth & Peter Walker, Paul Nuttall Suffers Crushing
Defeat as UKIP Vote Collapses, THE GUARDIAN, June 8, 2017,
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jun/09/ukip-vote-collapse-puts-paul-nuttall-
leadership-in-danger.
6 John Irish, Down in Polls, France's Le Pen Targets Immigration for Boost,
REUTERS, Apr. 18, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-election/down-in-polls-
frances-le-pen-targets-immigration-for-boost-idUSKBN17K19Z ("Speaking to a rally in
Paris on Monday, [Marine Le Pen] vowed to suspend all immigration with an immediate
moratorium, shield voters from globalization and strengthen security."); The maps that show
how France voted and why, BBC, May 12, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
39870460 (showing an increase in Front Nationale's first-round presidential election vote
share in four out of five elections since 1995); German Election: Just How Right- Wing is
AJD?, BBC, Sept. 25, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37274201 ("AfD's big
success has been in challenging Angela Merkel's decision to let in around 1.3 million
undocumented migrants and refugees, mainly from the Middle East, since 2015."); German
Elections 2017: Full Results, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 25, 2017,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2017/sep/24/german-elections -2017-late
st-results -live-merkel-bundestag-afd (showing that AfD receiving the third-largest vote share
in the 2017 election).
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desire more protectionist approaches.7 An example can be seen in the outcome for
British Conservatives. Although Conservatives gained a majority in Parliament, 8
a referendum for Britain's presence in the European Union (promised by Prime
Minister David Cameron during the election campaign of 2015) resulted in a
majority voting to leave.9
While the subsequent round of elections in 2017 in the United Kingdom,
France, and Germany did not produce the dramatic change populists in the United
Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), Front Nationale (FN), and Alternative fir
Deutschland (AfD) clamored for, the rapid policy changes enacted by President
Trump have given several of these parties tantalizing glimpses of what might be
possible if they join a coalition government or win a presidency.10 President
Trump's bewilderingly rapid11 enactment of Executive Order 1376912 represents
the predominant example of such action as other immigration measures stall or have
7 Henry Samuel, Nicolas Sarkozy says immigrants must accept "'your ancestors are
the Gauls, " THE TELEGRAPH, Sept. 20, 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/09/20/
nicolas -sarkozy-says -immigrants -should-live-like-the-french (quoting former president
Sarkozy, "If you want to become French, you speak French, you live like the French. We
will no longer settle for integration that does not work, we will require assimilation."); Amita
Joshi, General election 2017: Where each party stands on immigration, THE TELEGRAPH,
June 7, 2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/O/general-election-2017-party-stands-
immigration (showing the Conservative Party's pledge to double the Immigration Skills
Charge and to reduce net migration to the "tens-of-thousands"); Justin Heggler, Angela
Merkelpresents new plan to boost asylum deportations as shefights back against challenger,
THE TELEGRAPH, Feb. 9, 2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/09/angela-merkel-
presents -new-plan-boost-asylum-deportations -fights.
8 Election 2015: Results, BBC, http://www.bbc.com/news/election/2015/results
(last visited Feb. 26, 2019).
9 David Cameron promises in/out referendum on EU, BBC, Jan. 23, 2013,
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-21148282; Brexit: David Cameron to quit after UK
votes to leave EU, BBC, June 24, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-36615028.
1o See Angelique Chrisafis, Marine Le Pen Says Trump's Victory Marks 'Great
Movement Across World,' THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 9, 2016,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/09/marine -l -pen-says -trumps -victory-
marks-great-movement-across-world; Christopher Hope, Nigel Farage Tells Donald Trump
Rally: 'I Wouldn't Vote for Clinton if You Paid Me,' THE TELEGRAPH, Aug. 25, 2016,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/08/25/nigel-farage-tells-donald-trump-rally-i-
wouldnt -vote -for-clinton.
i Johnathan Allen & Brendan O'Brien, How Trump's Abrupt Immigration Ban
Sowed Confusion at Airports, Agencies, REUTERS, Jan. 28, 2017,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us -usa-trump-immigration-confusion/how-trumps -abrupt-
immigration-ban-sowed-confusion-at-airports -agencies -idUSKBN1 5D07S.
12 Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (2017). Frequently referred to
elsewhere as the "travel ban" or "Muslim ban." This Note discusses three iterations of the
policy and therefore refers to the "first," "second," and "third order[s]."
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been deferred to Congress.13 While this action was being challenged and-for the
most part-stayed by federal courts, the Supreme Court upheld the final iteration
of the Order in June 2018.14 This back-and-forth raises the question of whether
democracies should evaluate their separation of powers regimes as they relate to
immigration or administrative law more broadly.
Whether one favors more restricted immigration for a given country or not,
a rapid but confused deployment of any given policy is inadvisable for societies that
value stability, proscriptions against vagueness, and consistent enforcement. 15 If
the lack of clarity attendant in Executive Order 13769 represents a sea of amorphous
or ill-defined policy, the potential for administrative inaction in the face of
legitimate pressures to the contrary represents a pitfall where potentially good
policy goes to die.16 Naturally, this political balancing act seems to be, in some
form, necessary throughout any democratic government that values distribution of
13 Michael D. Shear & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump Moves to EndDACA and Calls
on Congress to Act, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/05/us/
politic s/trump -daca-dreamers -immigration.html.
14 See generally Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017),
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.Ct. 2392 (2018); Lawrence Hurley, Trump Opponents Urge U.S.
Supreme Court to Rule on Travel Ban, REUTERS, Oct. 5, 2017,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us -usa-court-immigration/trump-opponents-urge-u-s -
supreme-court-to-rule-on-travel-ban-idUSKBN1 CA244.
15 See Katie R. Eyer, Administrative Adjudication and the Rule ofLaw, 60 ADMN. L.
REV. 647, 653 (2008) ("[A]gency adjudication should theoretically have the ability to (1)
increase consistency in the legal standards that are applied across the legal system; (2)
promote predictability for regulated entities through rule creation; and (3) restrict
government discretion that might otherwise be entirely unchecked."); see also Richard A.
Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 4, 33 (1987)
("The stability of the constitutional framework has economic value; by reducing uncertainty
it facilitates investment. Stability is not the only value served by law, which is why a rigid
policy of stare decisis is not optimal; but it is a value and it therefore weighs on the side of a
policy of constrained constitutional lawmaking."); Michel Rosenfeld, The Rule of Law and
the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1307, 1338 (2001) ("Even if
one concedes that common law unpredictability permeates the entire American legal system,
this does not necessarily preclude a successful deployment of the rule of law, so long as the
latter is conceived of primarily in procedural rather than substantive terms.").
16 See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review ofAgency Inaction: An Arbitrariness
Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1657, 1660 (2004) ("The constitutional structure should be
understood as dedicated to preventing arbitrariness and not just promoting accountability.
More specifically, the constitutional structure should be viewed as concerned with inhibiting
administrative decision making that reflects narrow interests rather than public purposes.");
Michael E. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency
Inaction, 101 GEO. L. REv. 1337, 1341 (2013) (citing Daniel Carpenter & David Moss,
Introduction to PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW
TO LIIT IT 1, 19 (Daniel Carpenter & David Moss eds. 2013) ("Capture can have deleterious
effects on the regulatory system by promoting unnecessary and inefficient rulemaking and
also by impeding efficient regulation that serves the public interest.")).
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power as a means of avoiding autocracy while still functioning as a government
capable of policymaking. 17
However, immigration policy is an exceptionally difficult issue when
considering the separation of powers context due to its nexus between
administrative law, deep-seated cultural implications that enter into democratic
discourse,1 8 and the potential need for rapid adjustment in the face of national crisis
or institutional failure to apply the law.19 Parsing through these issues, this Note
will compare the process of making immigration law in the United States, the
United Kingdom, and France from a separation of powers perspective to identify
the structural advantages of each system in producing executive action in a manner
that advances the rule of law. Space prohibits a competent discussion of the effects
of international treaties and supranational bodies such as the European Union;
therefore, this Note will restrict this survey to constitutional and statutory structures.
This Note will examine Executive Order 13769, its subsequent revisions,
its legal challenges, and the restraints (or spurs) present in the above countries that
may prohibit or give rise to similar debacles. In so doing, one finds that strong-
form judicial review in the United States cannot provide a complete guard against
the consequences of hastily promulgated and poorly drafted legislation, and (as the
end result of the Trump v. Hawaii litigation proves) such review is also no guarantee
that plaintiffs alleging fundamental rights violations will get their way. However,
the lack of such review in the United Kingdom and France, coupled with the co-
mingling of executive and legislative power, results in fewer checks against an
executive willing to put forward incompetent or invalid administrative or legislative
directives. Therefore, the separation of powers regime in the United States remains
better suited to guard against the consequences of such action.
17 See THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison) ("The accumulation of all powers,
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and
whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, mayjustly be pronounced the very definition
of tyranny."); Aziz Z. Huq & Jon. D. Michaels, The Cycles of Separation of Powers
Jurisprudence, 126 YALE L. J. 346, 352 (2016) ("Consider, for example, the way in which
the separation of powers promotes efficiency by eliciting institutional specialization among
the branches and prevents tyranny by diffusing power between different branches; such aims
are not necessarily or inevitably commensurable. Indeed, they regularly conflict.").
is See Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Judicial Review of Initiatives and Referendums in
Which Majorities Vote on Minorities Democratic Citizenship, 60 OHIO ST. L. J. 399, 453
(1999) (discussing the connection between the reelection campaign of California governor
Pete Wilson and the campaign for Proposition 187).
19 See generally Syndenham B. Alexander III, A Political Response to Crisis in the
Immigration Courts, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L. REv. 1 (2006) (discussing the negative
consequences of Attorney General John Ashcroft's attempt to eliminate unnecessary delays).
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II. EXECUTIVE ORDER 13769: CHALLENGES AND REVISIONS
President Trump issued Executive Order 13769 on January 27, 2017,
seven days after taking office z.2  This first order, following a description of its
rationale,21 directed the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to
conduct a review of the immigration procedure to "determine the information
needed from any country to adjudicate any visa, admission, or other benefit under
the [Immigration and Nationality Act], 22 with particular emphasis on the ability of
the United States to determine the true identity of each individual seeking
admission, and to determine if they pose a security risk to the United States.23 The
review was to conclude in 60 days with the Secretary notifying nations that did not
provide sufficient information that they were thereby requested to do so. 24 If such
countries did not begin producing the requested information, the Secretary was to
present a list of recommended countries to the President for inclusion in the order,
thereby suspending entry of aliens from those countries until they submitted the
required information.25  Concurrent with this review, the President issued a
proclamation to the effect that the entry of aliens from countries of concern
identified pursuant to the Visa Waiver Program governing statute26 were to be
immediately suspended for a period of 90 days.27 Additionally, the Secretary of
State was to suspend the US Refugee Admission Program (USRAP) for 120 days,
during which the Secretary would review admission procedures, and institute
changes once the 120 days had been completed.28 The order stated that § 3(c), §
5(c), and § 5(d) were to be effected by presidential proclamations, while the
remainder of the order came in the form of directives to the secretaries of named
departments.
The most immediate consequence of the order was instant confusion
among those traveling when the order was promulgated,29 and among officials
20 Exec. Order No. 13769.
21 Id. §1 ("In order to protect Americans, the United States must ensure that those
admitted to this country do not bear hostile attitudes toward it and its founding principles.").
22 Id. § 3(a)-(b).
23 Id.
24 Id. § 3(d).
25 Exec. Order No. 13769, § 3(e).
26 8 U.S.C. § 1187(a)(12) (2018); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security,
DHS Announces Further Travel Restrictions for the Visa Waiver Program (Feb. 18, 2016),
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/02/18/dhs -announces-further-travel-restrictions -visa-
waiver-program (listing the countries from which alien travel would be restricted as being:
Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Syria, Libya, Somalia, Yemen).
27 Exec. Order No. 13769, § 3(c).
28 Id.§5.
29 The original order did not specify the time of day after which a person could not
enter the U.S. if otherwise subject to the ban. See also Shear & Nixon, infra note 30.
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tasked with its enforcement.3 Almost immediately, challenges to the order were
filed, and preliminary injunctions were granted by federal courts in Washington and
Virginia. 1 The President responded by issuing a second Executive Order on March
6, 2017.32 Section 1 of the new order provided further explanatory details on why
the President felt the first order was required and why particular countries had been
selected for travel restrictions.33 Section 2 reordered the suspension of travel in a
manner and justification akin to § 3 of the original order, including six countries in
its sweep-removing Iraq from the list.34 Section 3 provided clarifying details as
to which foreign nationals were affected by the order,
35 and provided exceptions.36
Sections 4 and 5 again provided for general review of immigration
procedures with an additional admonition that he Secretary of Homeland Security
utilize information received from the Iraqi government to review visa applications
from that country on a case-by-case basis.37  Section 6 required a (clarified)
suspension of USRAP for 120 days from the date of the second order.38 Section 7
required the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security o consider rescinding their
authority to voluntarily grant exceptions to individuals or groups who otherwise fell
under the prohibition against visa issuance for prior terrorist or terrorism-related
activities 9.3  Section 8 required that the Secretary of Homeland Security expedite
30 Michael D. Shear & Ron Nixon, How Trump's Rush to Enact an Immigration Ban
Unleashed Global Chaos, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/29
/us/politics/donald-trump-rush-immigration-order-chaos.html?mcubz 1 (revealing that: 1)
no legal review had been conducted of the order prior to signing, 2) then-Secretary of
Homeland Security, Gen. John Kelly was receiving his first briefing on the order as the
President signed it, and 3) that the lack of notice generated significant confusion for
passengers bound for the U.S.).
31 See generally Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D.
Wash.) (issuing temporary restraining order against the government from implementing §
3(c), §5 (a)-(c), § 5 (e) nationwide), aff'd 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017); see generally Aziz
v. Trump, 234 F. Supp.3d 724 (E.D. Va. 2017) (ordering a preliminary injunction against
enforcement of § 3 of Exec. Order 13769 against residents of Virginia).
32 Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 [hereinafter Exec. Order No. 13780].
33 Exec. Order No. 13780, § 1.
34 Id. § 2(c).
35 Id. § 3(a)(i)-(iii) ("[T]his order shall apply only to foreign nationals of the
designated countries who: "are outside the United States on the effective date of this order;
did not have a valid visa at 5:00 p.m., eastern standard time on January 27, 2017; and do not
have a valid visa on the effective date of this order.").
36 Exec. Order No. 13780, § 3(b)-(c).
37 Id. § 4-5.
38 Id. § 6(a) ("The Secretary of State shall suspend travel of refugees into the United
States under the USRAP, and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall suspend ecisions on
applications for refugee status, for 120 days after the effective date of this order.") (emphasis
added).
39 Id. § 7 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(B) (2013) for the mentioned authority); see
also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (for the prohibition against visa issuance to aliens who have
engaged in various forms of terrorist activity).
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the completion of a biometric tracking system for visitors to the United States
subject to such monitoring under the scope of the program.40 Section 9 required
that the Secretary of State immediately suspend the Visa Interview Waiver
Program.41  Section 10 required a review of visa reciprocity agreements,42 and
Section 11 required making additional information on foreign nationals charged
with terrorist offenses publicly available.
43
Section 12 attempted to rectify confusion surrounding enforcement of the
order by: (1) providing for consultation between department secretaries and
"domestic and international partners . . . to ensure efficient, effective, and
appropriate implementation of the actions directed in this order";44 (2) allowing for
alien claims of credible fear of persecution or torture;45 (3) prohibiting revocation
of visas issued before the effective date of the instant order; (4) entitling those
whose travel documents were marked cancelled ue to the first order to nevertheless
travel to the United States; and (5) restricting applicability against refugees already
admitted and those granted withholding of removal under the Convention Against
Torture.46 Sections 13-16 revoked the prior order, set an effective date, added a
severability provision, and provided additional general provisions-all of which
were lacking in the former order.
47
With clearer measures in place, and an effective date of March 16, 2017,
Executive Order 13780 gave administrative agencies ten days to prepare for
implementation, and time for aggrieved parties to file suits to enjoin enforcement
of the order before it went into effect.48 The plaintiffs in Hawaii v. Trump succeeded
in enjoining nationwide enforcement of § 2 and § 6 of the order.49 Concurrently,
the District Court of Maryland in Int 'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump also
enjoined enforcement of § 2(c) nationwide.50 Each of these injunctions were
affirmed, at least in part, on appeal.51 Given that the timed portions of the second
40 Exec. Order No. 13780, § 8.
41 Id. § 9(a).
42 Id. § 10.
43 Id. § 11.
44 Id. § 12(a)
45 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A) (2009).
46 Exec. Order No. 13780, § 12(e).
47 Compare id. § 13-16 with Exec. Order 13769. Section 13 revokes the original
order. Section 14 gives an effective date of March 16, 2017, 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time.
Section 15 is a severability provision. Section 16 provides construction instructions regarding
other laws.
48 Given that the original order was effective immediately, no party had the
opportunity to sue prior to its enforcement.
49 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1140 (D. Haw. 2017).
50 241 F. Supp. 3d 539, 565 (D. Md. 2017).
51 Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 788 (9th Cir. 2017) (affirming district court's
enjoinment of §§ 2(a), 6(a)-(b) and vacating the enjoinment of those portions of the
executive order relating to interagency review of procedure, and the enjoinment of the
President); Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 605-06 (4th Cir. 2017)
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executive order were stayed by courts before going into effect, the President issued
a memorandum on June 14, 2017 making clear that the effective date of the stayed
provisions was to be the date on which each injunction was to be lifted.5 2 The US
Supreme Court granted certiorari on June 26, 2017 to defendants in both cases and
stayed the injunctions upheld below, insofar as they pertained to individuals without
a "bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States."53
In granting certiorari, the Supreme Court discussed several arguments
made by the parties that implicated the principle of separation of powers-although
only in the context of deciding whether the equities in the case favored a stay of the
injunctions entered below.54 The first of these was raised by plaintiff John Doe in
the Hawaii line of cases: that the second executive order violated the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment by "singling out Muslims for disfavored treatment"
in predominately naming majority Muslim nations as subject to the ban under § 2(c)
of the order.55 This was in addition to "discriminating between 'minority religions'
and majority religions" in its attempted reformulation of USRAP in § 5(b), (e).
56
While the plaintiff cited Larson v. Valente57 for the proposition that "one religious
denomination cannot be officially preferred over another," and further claimed that
the government did not justify the alleged preference by any compelling interest,
the plaintiff did not initially address what became defendant's case-on-point for this
issue: Kliendienst v. Mandel.58 Kliendienst implicates the principle of separation of
powers in that it proscribes what courts may consider when determining the validity
of exclusion by the executive.59 Namely, the Court in Kliendienst held that:
When the Executive exercises [the power to exclude aliens] on
the basis of afacially legitimate and bonaJide reason, the courts
will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it
by balancing its justification against the First Amendment
interests of those who seek personal communication with the
applicant. 6
0
(affirming the lower courts' enjoinment against enforcement of § 2(c) but vacating
enjoinment against the President), vacated as moot, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017).
52 Effective Date in Exec. Order 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 27965 (2017).
53 Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087 (2017).
54 Id. (citing Univ. of Tex. v. Caminisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981)) ("The purpose
of such interim equitable relief is not to conclusively determine the rights of the parties.").
55 Joint Appendix, Vol. 1 at 221, Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S.
Ct. 2080 (2017) (Nos. 16-1436, 16-1540) 2017 WL 3448008 at *107.
56 Compl. for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 151-52, Int'l Refugee
Assistance Project v. Trump, 2017 WL 511943 (D. Md. 2017).
57 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982).
58 See generally 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
59 Id. at 769-770.
60 Id. at 770 (emphasis added); see also Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 309-10 (1981)
(holding that the revocation of a passport where there is a likelihood of damage to U.S.
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While the Court leaves open the option to consider First Amendment
implications where "no justification whatsoever"" is presented, the application of
the facially legitimate and bona fide test would preclude plaintiffs implication of
the First Amendment given the President's national security justification. 62
In International Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, the Fourth Circuit
reasoned that Kliendienst must be interpreted in light of other cases that suggest that
congressional (and therefore, delegated executive) immigration policy authority is
not without limit.63  The Fourth Circuit pointed to Zadvydas and Chadha for
instances in which the broad power of Congress and the President in regulating
immigration is subject to judicial review.6' In seeking to apply both lines of case
law, the Fourth Circuit looked to Justice Kennedy's controlling concurrence in
Kerry v. Din.65 There it was held, absent a showing of bad faith by the Executive
branch, the Court was not permitted to look behind the contested action.66 The
Fourth Circuit held, based on the statements of then-candidate Donald Trump, as
well as policy elucidated in office,67 that such a showing had been made, and courts
may look behind the national security justification.68
national security interests is within the statutory authorization of the Secretary of State and
is not impermissibly burdensome under the First Amendment).
61 Kliendienst, 408 U.S. at 770.
62 Exec. Order No. 17380, § 1 (b)(ii) ("I determined that ... while existing screening
and vetting procedures were under review, the entry into the United States of certain aliens
from the seven identified countries-each afflicted by terrorism in a manner that
compromised the ability of the United States to rely on normal decision-making procedures
about travel to the United States-would be detrimental to the interests of the United
States."); id. § 1 (c)-(h) (for descriptions in brief of the security concerns presented by the six
nations covered by the second executive order).
63 Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 590 ("But in another more recent line
of cases, the Supreme Court has made clear that despite the political branches' plenary power
over immigration, that power is still subject to important constitutional limitations.")
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (holding
that the Attorney General may only detain an alien subject to deportation for a reasonable
period of time, rather than indefinitely) and INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding
that the section of the Immigration and Nationality Act authorizing the one -House veto of an
immigration judge's decision to stay the deportation of an alien violated the doctrine of
separation of powers)).
64 Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 590 ("We are bound to give effect to
both lines of cases, meaning that we must enforce constitutional limitations on immigration
actions while also applying Mandel's deferential test o those actions as the Supreme Court
has instructed.").
65 See 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015).
66 Id. at 2141.
67 Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 591-92.
68 Id. at 594-601 (accepting plaintiff's suggestion of applying the Lemon v. Kurtzman
test for religious purpose and finding that the second executive order "likely fails Lemon's
purpose prong in violation of the Establishment Clause.") (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971)).
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A further argument considered the text of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA) and plenary congressional control over immigration legislation. 69 It is
concrete constitutional law that a President cannot issue any order that does not
"stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself"70 Since in this
case, the President relies upon the INA for his authority,71 it is necessary for the
courts to consider the text of the INA and to "give effect to all parts of [the] statute,
if at all possible."72 Despite the President's reliance on 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) and §
1185(a) for a broad grant of authority to suspend the entry of aliens, the Ninth
Circuit contends that this power is cabined by the requirement of § 1182(f) that the
President "find" rather than "deem" the entry of certain aliens detrimental to the
United States, as well as the prohibition on national origin discrimination found in
§ 1152(a)(1)(A).73 Thus, the court may find that, as a matter of executive authority,
the power of the President here is either "at its lowest ebb" or is middling at best.74
On the balance between permitting the political branches to operate
efficiently and prohibiting the unconstitutional burdening of plaintiffs First
Amendment rights, the Fourth Circuit may have waded into uncomfortably
burdensome waters. Besides the potentially troublesome precedent of having
(implicitly) extended the rights granted under the First Amendment to foreign
nationals outside the United States-and thereby running headlong into
Kliendienst-the court stares down a pernicious hypothetical: what to do when an
allegedly bigoted President correctly identifies a legitimate national security threat?
Under the rationale just explained, an uncouth President faces the invalidation of
potentially vital (and facially plausible) national security policy-a foreseeably
problematic leap by a court in times of emergency.75
Before any of these pressing questions could be reviewed, the ground
shifted yet again. As the period mandated by § 2(c) of the second executive order
69 Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 694-98 (9th Cir. 2017).
70 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952).
71 See generally Exec. Order No. 17380.
72 Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d at 695 (quoting Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott &
Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 633 (1973)).
73 Id. at 690-97.
74 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637-38 (Jackson, J. concurring) (discussing three
categories of executive action: 1) where the President acts with an express grant of power
from Congress; 2) where the President acts according to his own inherent power; or 3) where
the President acts in the absence of either an express grant of power or any inherent power).
The reasoning of the Ninth Circuit would place the travel ban series of executive orders in
either the second or third category.
75 Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermuele, Emergencies and Democratic Failure, 92 VA.
L. REv. 1091, 1094-95 (2006) ("Smoking out government animus or opportunism requires
information the judges do not have in times of emergency; the costs of judicial mistakes are
higher, because judicial invalidation of a policy necessary for national security may have
disastrous consequences; and the sheer delay created by vigorous judicial review is more
costly as well, because time is at a premium in emergencies."); see also JOSEPH HELLER,
CATCH-22 (1961) ("Just because you're paranoid doesn't mean they aren't after you.").
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for exclusion of foreign nationals lapsed on September 24, 2017, the Supreme Court
remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit with instructions to dismiss as moot on
October 10, 2017.76 On the same day that the second executive order's exclusion
period lapsed, a third order was issued by way of proclamation from the President.77
This order stated in part that the review of information sharing required by § 4 and
§ 5 of the previous order had been completed by the Secretary of State.78 This
review identified three forms of information sharing that the President declared
essential to the security of the United States: identity management information,
national security and public-safety information, and national security and public
safety risk-assessment.79
Using these categories, the Secretary of Homeland Security submitted a
report to the President on September 15, 2017, that found seven countries whose
information sharing, as measured against the above three metrics, was deemed
"inadequate," and recommended entry estrictions and limitations be implemented
on them.80 These countries were: Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela,
and Yemen.81 Iraq was also determined to have inadequate information sharing
capacities.82 However, considering the continuing close relationship between the
United States and Iraq, as well as the Iraqi government's continued commitment to
fighting terrorism, the order stated that restrictions as severe as those levied on other
nations identified were not warranted.83 A middling level of "additional scrutiny"
was instead recommended for Iraqi nationals. 
84
The President then listed a variety of factors he considered in evaluating
the recommendations of the Secretary of Homeland Security, which under the terms
of this iteration of the order, were to be revisited when justifications for each travel
restriction are presented in § 2.85 Additionally, the President clarified that he was
"adopting a more tailored approach" in distinguishing between the entry of non-
immigrant foreign nationals and immigrant ones." In § 2, the President listed the
76 See generally Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d 554.
77 Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017).
78 Id.
79 Id. § l(c)(i)-(iii).
80 Id. § 1(g).
81 Id.
82 Proclamation No. 9645, § 1 (g).
83 Id. § 1(g).
84 Id.
85 Id. § I(i).
86 Proclamation No. 9645, § 1(h)(ii)-(iii) (In making the distinction, the President
cites the fact that: "The United States affords lawful permanent residents more enduring
rights than it does to nonimmigrants. Lawful permanent residents are more difficult to
remove than nonimmigrants even after national security concerns arise, which heightens the
costs and dangers of errors associated with admitting such individuals. And although
immigrants generally receive more extensive vetting than nonimmigrants, such vetting is less
reliable when the country from which someone seeks to emigrate exhibits significant gaps in
its identity-management or information-sharing policies, or presents risks to the national
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justifications for each restricted country.87  These justifications are more
qualitatively detailed than those presented in the second executive order.88 Section
3 set forth the scope and implementation of the suspensions.89 Section 4 required
that the suspensions be reviewed every 180 days for the purpose of recommending
whether they should be cancelled or modified.90 Section 5 required that reports on
screening and vetting procedures be submitted to the President.91  Section 6
delegated enforcement to the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security, and also
provided that they comply with regulations that "provide an opportunity for
individuals to enter the United States on the basis of a credible claim of fear of
persecution or torture."92 Section 7 set forth effective dates and incorporated the
Supreme Court's limitations by placing suspensions on those who "lack a credible
claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States" until
October 18, 2017-at which point suspensions would apply to all such countries. 
93
One can detect a hint of on-the-nose exasperation in the opinion issued by
the District Court of Hawaii on the final order.94 This latest holding concerns only
the countries named in § 2(a), (b), (c), (e), (g), and (h), and holds that the new order
is also constitutionally deficient.95 The judge again held that the findings do not
support the conclusion (as required under the INA) 96 that "nationality alone renders
entry of this broad class of individuals a heightened security risk."97 The court also
found again that no explanation was made as to why the President deemed existing
procedures inadequate, as the applicant for admission bears the burden of proving
eligibility to enter the United States,98 and that the policy decisions concerning Iraq
(and now Venezuela) undermined the national security rationale presented by the
President.99 The court held in favor of the plaintiffs again, and enjoined the
security of the United States. For all but one of those 7 countries, therefore, I am restricting
the entry of all immigrants.").
87 Id. §2.
88 They are also accompanied in the latest iteration by the specific visa programs that
are suspended for each nation. Compare ProclamationNo. 9645 § 2, with Exec. Order 17380,
§ 1 (c)-(h).
89 Proclamation No. 9645, § 3.
90 Id. § 4(a).
91 Id. § 5.
92 Id. § 6(b).
93 Id. § 7(a)(ii).
94 State v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1144-45 (D. Haw. 2017) ("Professional
athletes mirror the federal government in this respect: they operate within a set of rules, and
when one among them forsakes those rules in favor of his own, problems ensue. And so it
goes with EO-3.").
95 See id. at 1146 (The countries being Iran, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, and Chad.
The restrictions on North Korea and Venezuela were not enjoined).
96 Id. at 1154 (citing Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d at 772-73).
97 Id. at 1155-56 (citing Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d at 772.).
98 Id. at 1156.
99 State v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 1156-57.
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responsible secretaries from enforcing § 2(a), (b), (c), (e), (g), and (h) of the order. 100
Despite the District Court's similar conclusion in the latest argument of Trump v.
Int'l Refugee Assistance Project,10 1 the Supreme Court allowed enforcement of the
third order on December 4, 2017, staying the lower court holdings, pending appeal
to the Ninth and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeals.1 2 Subsequently, both the Ninth
and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeals affirmed the decisions made by the lower
courts, with the Supreme Court then granting certiorari.103
On June 26, 2018, the Supreme Court held that the President had validly
exercised his authority granted under the INA in issuing the third executive order,
putting an end to plaintiffs' efforts to enjoin the policy.1" In its ruling, the Court
held that the President was granted broad power under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(t) (§ 212 of
the INA) to exclude aliens, and that the section "exudes deference to the President
in every clause."10 5 More to the point, the Court held that the President was not
obligated to "explain [his] finding with sufficient detail to enable judicial
review,"' 106 and that in any case the President had provided a "worldwide multi-
agency review" to satisfy that end,10 7 and that the order otherwise comported with
statutory restrictions in identifying a legitimate class and restricting the measure's
scope to the time necessary to address executive concerns.108 The Court dismissed
plaintiffs' legislative history-based arguments given the unambiguous nature of the
text;10 9 it further dismissed plaintiffs arguments based on an INA section
prohibiting visa denials based on certain characteristics, including nationality,
because that subsection governs only visa issuance rather than admissibility
determinations regulated by the executive order.
1 0
In addressing the First Amendment claims raised by the plaintiffs, the
Court, while noting the President's expressed animus,111 concluded that that the
proper standard of review was rational basis; despite agreeing with the
Government's suggestion that it would be appropriate to look beyond the facial
justification of the order, as distinct from Kliendienst. 112 This was the result of the
100 State v. Trump, 265 F. Supp. 3d at 1160
101 265 F. Supp. 3d 570, 633 (2017).
102 See generally Hughes v. U.S., 138 S. Ct. 542 (Mem) (2017).
103 Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d at 673; Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 883
F.3d 233, 274 (4th Cir. 2018); Hawaii v. Trump, 138 S. Ct. 923 (Mem) (2018).
104 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2408 (2018).
105 Id.
106 Id. at 2409.
107 Id.
'o' Id. at 2409-10.
109 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2412.
110 Id. at 2414-15.
.. Id. at 2416-18.
112 Id. at 2419 (citing Kliendienst, 408 U.S. at 769) The Court circumscribes this probe
to "consider[ing] plaintiffs' extrinsic evidence, but will uphold the policy so long as it can
reasonably be understood to result from a justification independent of unconstitutional
grounds." Id. at 20.
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twin justifications noted above: the traditional purview of the legislature (in both
congressional action and presumably in its delegation of power to the president) in
governing questions of immigration,113 and the unique disability of the courts to
evaluate national security justifications.114 That said, the majority notes that the
Government conceded the possibility that it would nevertheless be appropriate to
extend its inquiry beyond the facial neutrality of the order.115 The Court then, as
the issues raised by plaintiffs concern the admissibility of foreign nationals, opts for
rational basis review of the order, and predictably finds a sufficient link between
the policy and "the Government's stated objective to protect the country and
improve vetting processes." 
116
Justice Kennedy offered a brief concurrence to note that, while the
motivations behind government action may in some cases be unreviewable, as in
the instant example, the government is not simply free to disregard fundamental
rights.117 Justice Thomas also authored a concurring opinion voicing his concern
with the lower court issuance of universal injunctions against the Government's
policies, as being unsupported by statute, constitutional text, or the history of
judicial powers. 
118
As for the dissents, Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion (joined by Justice
Kagan) is grounded in the practical impacts of the order on admission to the United
States, with a focus on the individual review and waiver provisions.119 They
observe evidence offered by plaintiffs that the government was not abiding by the
ostensibly rights-protecting portions of the proclamation in their exercise, and
would have accordingly remanded the case or invalidated the order.120 The other
dissent, by Justice Sotomayor (joined by Justice Ginsburg), seizes on the lengthy
list of statements by President Trump concerning Muslims, and concludes that "a
reasonable observer would conclude that the Proclamation was driven primarily by
anti-Muslim animus, rather than by the Government's asserted national-security
justifications." '121 Seizing on the majority's circumscribed explanation of its use of
rational basis, it would have held that the proper standard of review, given that an
113 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2418 (citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977);
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952)).
114 Id. at 2419 (citing Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010)).
115 Id.
116 Id. at 2420-21 (citing Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980)).
117 Id. at 2424 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
118 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2425-29 (Thomas, J., concurring).
119 Id. at 2432-33.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 2438.
206 Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law Vol. 36, No. 2 2019
Establishment Clause claim is not evaluated on rational basis, but rather strict
scrutiny... and would have accordingly invalidated the order. 123
In tracing the case as it unfolded, one observes at minimum, three
separation-of-powers-oriented concerns emerging: (1) how can a legislature ensure
that orders drafted to enforce delegated powers are issued in a manner that
minimizes confusion-as President Trump's first order failed to do-through its
authorizing legislation; (2) what constitutional structures would enable a legislature
to implement immigration law in a manner that balances legitimate foreign and
domestic policy against potential populist pressure; and (3) what role should judicial
review play in evaluating policy implementation. To see what effect constitutional
structures have (or could have) on immigration law, we will begin by discussing the
British system.
III. BRITISH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND SEPARATION OF
POWERS
Despite there being no written "Constitution of the United Kingdom," the
central operating principle of the UK is universally understood to be the sovereignty
and supremacy of Parliament.1 24 This sovereignty may be summed up with two
axioms: (1) that Parliament has the right to make or unmake any law whatsoever;
and (2) that no government body can set aside the legislation of Parliament. 125 This
would seem at first inimical to separation of powers generally (in the US sense) and
judicial review in particular as commentators in both the United States and United
Kingdom have pointed out.126  Nevertheless, both principles find themselves
122 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2440-41 (citing McCreary Cty. of Ky. v. ACLU of
Ky., 545 U.S. 844,860-63 (2005); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982); Presbyterian
Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449-52
(1969)).
123 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2441. The dissent also holds that the order was
invalid anyway under rational basis, taking the position of plaintiffs who argue that the order
is motivated by the simple desire to harm Muslims.
124 VERNON BOGDANOR, THE NEW BRITISH CONSTITUTION 12 (2009).
125 See id. at 12-13 ("But in addition to this historical reason why we do not have a
codified constitution, there is also a conceptual reason. It is that the fundamental, perhaps the
only principle at the basis of our system of government, has been the sovereignty of
parliament."); see also A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION 4 (Liberty Fund 1982) (1885) (more precisely stating: 1) "Any act of
Parliament, or any part of an act of Parliament, which makes a new law, or repeals or modifies
an existing law, will be obeyed by Courts," and 2) "There is no person or body of persons
who can, under English law, make rules which override or derogate from an act of
Parliament.").
126 J.W.F. ALLISON, THE ENGLISH HISTORICAL CONSTITUTION: CONTINUITY CHANGE
AND EUROPEAN EFFECTS 85 (2007) (quoting British law professor Anthony Bradley
concerning the Lord Chancellor prior to reform, "all well-catechised lawyers know [the
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represented to a limited degree in the British system of government. Separation of
powers has generally been found in the British system to be muddled in terms of
practical effect but distinguished by way of constitutional authority. 127
A. Development and Scope of British Executive and Judicial Power
Regarding the executive and legislative powers, at one point, the Crown
(from which all governmental authority still emanates by way of the royal
prerogative)128 had the authority to issue proclamations with the force of
legislation.129 As that power no longer exists, nearly all legislative authority rests
with Parliament. 130 It is now common political parlance to distinguish between the
Crown as the Head of State, and the Prime Minister being the Head of
Government.3 Besides this separation of nominally executive power, each
Minister of a Department (appointed by the Prime Minister) holds some inferior
degree of executive authority-and certainly is held to collective accountability-
for the performance of government agencies in general, as well as over the agencies
office of Lord Chancellor as both government minister and head of the judiciary] to be living
proof that separation of powers does not exist in Britain and we are better off without it.").
Debra Perlin, Marbury on the Thames: Separation of Powers in the United Kingdom's
Nascent Supreme Court, 42 N.C. J. INT'L L. 191, 200 (2016) ("Today, Parliament is
undisputedly and unabashedly the controlling force within the British government. In other
words, whereas the American system is rooted in judicial supremacy in the context of
policing separation of powers, the modern British system is rooted in parliamentary
sovereignty with no need for such policing.") (citing A.V. DICEY, LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
38-39 (10th ed. 1959)).
127 A.W. BRADLEY & K.D. EWING, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
92-93 (12th ed. 1997) (citing WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 65 (1867) for
the idea of "efficient secret" of the fusion of legislative and executive authority; L.S. AMERY,
THOUGHTS ON THE CONSTITUTION 28 (1953 ed.) for the contrary perspective that while
"intertwined and harmonized" the Government and Parliament remain "separate and
independent entities" with "separate historical origins," 'its own methods," and "its own
continuity.").
128 Id. at 271-80 (for instance, it is said that the King makes law through Parliament.).
129 See DICEY, supra note 125, at 11.
13o Id. (discussing the apotheosis of regal power reached by Act 31 Henry VIII., c.8 in
1539 which gave the Crown's proclamations the force of parliamentary legislation); see id.
at 13 (citing The Case of Proclamations, 12 Co. Rep. 74 [1610] for judicial clarification of
King Henry's act during the reign of James I: that the King may only seek enforcement of
the law through proclamation but may not legislate himself and noting the 1766 passage of
an Act of Parliament overriding a regal proclamation as the likely death-knell of Crown-
issued legislation). See also BRADLEY & EWING, supra note 127, at 269-71 (discussing the
Privy Council as one of the last (promulgatory) vestiges of royal legislative power).
131 Head of State, ENCYCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (Jun 20, 2013).
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that they personally oversee. 132 Naturally, this means that as Head of Government,
the Prime Minister has a significant degree of executive authority, including having
the authority to appoint and accept the resignation of department ministers, and to
create and abolish departments. 
133
The executive function is primarily vested in the Prime Minister who (in
addition to possessing the legislative prerogative as head of the majority party or
coalition)134 consults with the Crown concerning ministerial appointments,135 and
supervises the Cabinet decision-making.136  This latter responsibility bears the
closest resemblance to US executive authority-though with noticeably greater
stakes: consent of the majority party/coalition is required to continue governing,
with either a vote of no confidence or a leadership election being an ample method
of removing a Prime Minister.137 Thus, the resignation of a Cabinet minister with
whom the Prime Minister incorrigibly disagrees may provoke the wrath of the
Prime Minister's own party in the House of Commons.138 In keeping with the tenor
of the unwritten British Constitution, generally, it may be said that the majority of
the checks placed on the Prime Minister operating specifically as an executive are
political rather than statutory-that is, if one loses confidence, one loses position. 139
A further check on policy implementation exists in the form of the "fiercely
independent" civil service, of which the Prime Minister's Cabinet Secretary serves
as the head. 140
132 BRADLEY & EWING, supra note 127, at 115-30 (discussing the concept of
responsible government, whereby ministers are held responsible for implementing
government policy in their department and accountable for the actions of civil servant
actions-whether expressly ordered or not).
133 Id. at 289.
134 BRADLEY & EWING, supra note 127, at 93-94. (Authors note that while the majority
will generally not be defeated on policy issues, a modern feature of British government is the
tendency for secure majorities to suffer defections over severe policy disagreement when no
real danger of defeat is present).
135 See id. at 289. In effect, making the appointment.
136 PETER LEYLAND, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM: A CONTEXTUAL
ANALYSIS 161 (2d ed. 2012).
137 Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, c. 14, § 2(4) (UK),
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/14/pdfs/ukpga 20110014 en.pdf.
138 LEYLAND, supra note 136, at 162-63 (noting that Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher's fall from grace was preceded with the departure of her deputy Sir Geoffrey Howe,
causing her formerly formidable position to "evaporate.").
139 Id. at 159 ("but to hold the position of head of government, the incumbent needed
to have the confidence of the sovereign, and also to have the full support of Parliament. In
the contemporary constitution, it is the support of... the elected House of Commons, that is
crucial."); see also id. at 162-63.
140 LEYLAND, supra note 136, at 164-66. (Leyland notes that the civil service will
frequently provide "incomplete briefing and advice" on issues important to the Prime
Minister, coupled with "problems of communication and implementation." For a humorous
take on the problem: see generally, Yes Minister, (BBC television broadcast 1980-84).
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Before 2009, the highest court of appeals in the United Kingdom consisted
of the Law Lord members of the House of Lords sitting as a court. 141 The Lord
Chancellor was the officer entitled to preside over such judicial proceedings, and
was further responsible for recommending appointments to various courts. 142 The
Lord Chancellor was at that point-and remains-a member of the Cabinet, and
therefore acted in both the judicial and political realms.43 That any sort of tangible
distinction between those functions exists is a relatively new development in British
law, as the office of Lord Chancellor-which functioned as both head of judiciary
and as a member of the Prime Minister's Cabinet-was only recently modified by
the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005 to explicitly proscribe Cabinet interference
in judicial decisions, further separating legislative and judicial function.1 44 Under
Part 3 of the Act, a Supreme Court of the United Kingdom was constituted for the
first time in October 2009.145 This took the place of the House of Lords (sitting as
a court) as the final court of appeal in the United Kingdom.146 This development is
notable for our purposes for the future potential for additional judicial review. 
147
B. British Doctrine of Ultra Fires and Extent of Judicial Review
Before, and continuing with the establishment of the Supreme Court, the
judiciary of the United Kingdom had the closest approximated constitution-based
judicial review with ultra vires doctrine relating to executive acts and
administration.148 Nineteenth-century British courts laid out the outer contours of
ultra vires doctrine in holding that, "whatever may fairly be regarded as incidental
141 BRADLEY & EwNG, supra note 127, at 410. Criminal cases originating in Scotland
being excepted-final appeals for such cases were heard by the Scottish Inner House of the
Court of Session. See id. at 409.
142 Among numerous other responsibilities. Id. at 440.
143 Id. at 441.
144 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, c. 4, § 2 (for new qualifications for nomination
to the position of Lord Chancellor), § 3 (for the requirement that the Lord Chancellor as a
Cabinet member must not seek to influence judicial decisions through the special access they
possess), schs. 3, 4 (for nomination and other duties now assigned to or delegable by the Lord
Chancellor) (UK) [hereinafter Constitutional Reform Act 2005]; see also ALLISON, supra
note 126, at 85.
145 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, § 40; see also History, SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED KINGDOM, https://www.supremecourt.uk/about/history.html (last visited Feb. 27,
2019).
146 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, § 40.
147 See generally Perlin, supra note 126; see also Erin F. Delaney, Judiciary Rising:
Constitutional Change in the United Kingdom, 108 N.W. U. L. Rev. 543, 582-83 (2014)
(suggesting that the UK Supreme Court's vertical jurisdiction over acts of the devolved
Scottish Parliament may later extend to horizontal review of the UK Parliament).
148 Delaney, supra note 147, at 554-55 (describing the argument that the common law
may actually place some limits on Parliament and arise through ultra vires doctrine).
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to, or consequent upon, those things which the Legislature has authorised, ought not
(unless expressly prohibited) to be held, by judicial construction, to be ultra
vires."'14 9 The simplest definition of the doctrine is that, "if a decision-maker acts
beyond the powers conferred by legislation the courts simply exercise a supervisory
jurisdiction by interpreting the law so as to set limits on statutory authority." 150
The case R. (on the application of Pub. Law Project) v. Lord Chancellor
15 1
provides a recent example of the doctrine being utilized by the UK Supreme Court
to invalidate executive action. In it, the UK Supreme Court held to be ultra vires a
draft order prepared by the Lord Chancellor and laid before Parliament152 which
adopted a residency requirement for legal aid funding distributed under the Legal
Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012.153 The Lord Chancellor
had drafted the order pursuant to § 9(2)(b) of the Act which provided for so-called
"Henry VIII" power-the ability for the executive to actually vary the statute rather
than simply adding additional clarification and regulative language. 154 Secondary
legislation proposed by the executive, the Court notes, is enacted either by way of
an affirmative vote in the House of Commons, or (depending on the authorizing
statute) by not being voted down after a specified period. 155 Strikingly, at least for
a US audience, the Court framed its approach in terms of upholding Parliamentary
sovereignty156 -provided that full debate and consideration is not given to
149 S. A. DE SMITH, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 95 (4th ed. 1980)
(quoting Att'y Gen. v. Great Eastern Ry., (1880) 5 App. Cas. 473, 478).
150 LEYLAND, supra note 136, at 204-05. Leyland also notes the competitive common
law interpretation of judicial review which suggests that the common law provides a diverse
array of principles from which judicial review may arise without merely relying on legislative
intent. Id.
15 R. v. Lord Chancellor [2016] UKSC 39, 2016 WL 03626473 (appeal taken from
Eng., [2015] EWCA Civ 1139).
152 The Court explains the distinction between the order, which would constitute
"secondary legislation" and "primary legislation" or statutes to be that secondary legislation
is drafted by an executive and laid before Parliament for either a "negative resolution" or
"positive resolution" procedure (i.e. the order becomes law either by Parliament not voting
it down, or only if Parliament votes in favor of it). Id. § § 20-21.
153 See generally Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, c. 10
(Eng.) [hereinafter Legal Aid].
154 Id. § 9(2)(b).
155 Id. § 21.
156 Id. § 27 ("Whether subject to the negative or affirmative resolution procedure,
[subordinate legislation] is subject to much briefer, if any, examination by Parliament and
cannot be amended. The duty of the courts being to give effect to the will of Parliament, it
is... legitimate to take account of the fact that a delegation to the Executive of power to
modify primary legislation must be an exceptional course and that, if there is any doubt about
the scope of the power conferred upon the Executive or upon whether it has been exercised,
it should be resolved by a restrictive approach.") (emphasis added) (quoting MeKiernon v.
Sec. of State, The Times, November 1989, Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Transcript No.
1017 of 1989) (Lord Donaldson, MR).
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secondary legislation as it is to primary legislation, 157 it is appropriate for the Court
to review this exercise of authority to ensure that it comports with Parliamentary
intent.158 Under this framework, the Court engaged in statutory analysis of the
authorizing legislation, determining that the Lord Chancellor acted ultra vires in his
draft order. 
15 9
C. The Human Rights Act 1998 and Future British Judicial Review
Despite my earlier admonishment that his Note would not discuss
international law vis a vis treaties or conventions, the Human Rights Act 1998160
must play some role in our analysis. Of all recent legislation, it comes closest to
beginning to codify a British Constitution according to many commentators,
bringing Britain closer to Marbury-style judicial review. 161 This is not merely due
to it being a bill dealing with fundamental human rights, as Parliament had already
passed legislation on similar topics going back to the seventeenth century-most
notably what is known as the English Bill of Rights. 162 Rather, the Act requires that
157 See LEYLAND, supra note 136, at 135-40 for the process of passing Public and
Private Bills through Parliament, including three readings, debate, and assent by the House
of Lords and the Crown.
1s R v. Lord Chancellor, headings 22-23.
151 Id. headings 29-39.
160 See generally Human Rights Act 1998, c. 42 (UK).
161 See Perlin, supra note 126, at 193-94; id. at 219-20 (arguing that incorporation of
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights by the Human Rights act necessitated
the move from the House of Lords as a final court of appeals to a fully independent Supreme
Court, and demonstrating that the Human Rights Act 1998's grant of power to the courts to
declare statutes incompatible with the Convention is a move closer to judicial review-albeit
without the actual ability to overturn statutes passed by Parliament); see also Mary L. Clark,
Advice and Consent vs. Silence and Dissent? The Contrasting Roles of the Legislature in
U.S. and U.K. Judicial Appointments, 71 LA. L. REv. 451, 480-81 (2011) (calling the
incompatibility declaration ability a "significant power of judicial review."), Clive Walker
& Russell L. Weaver, The United Kingdom Bill ofRights 1998: The Modernisation ofRights
in the Old World, 33 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 497, 544-45 (2001) (stating that as the primary
duty of public officials under the Act is to not act in a manner incompatible with the
Convention, "English courts can no longer simply say that the law is clear and that reference
to the Convention is therefore not necessary. As far as public authorities such as the courts
are concerned, they always have a duty to refer to the Convention, so it becomes a relevant
consideration in almost any conceivable litigation even in litigation between purely private
parties who are themselves under no duty to act compatibly with the Convention."); Douglas
W. Vick, The Human Rights Act and the British Constitution, 37 TEx. INT'L L. J. 329, 362-
65 (2002) (suggesting that while the Act itself has no special legal status, its prestige, political
potency, and expansive view of rights compensate enough to make it more than a "damp
squib.").
162 Bill of Rights [ 1688], c. 21 Will. and Mar. sess. 2 (UK) [hereinafter Bill of Rights
[1688]].
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courts interpret statutes in a manner that is consistent with provisions163 of the
European Convention on Human Rights,1 64 and that statutes be read compatible
with the Convention. 165 A court may also declare statutes to be incompatible with
the Convention,166 allowing for judges to weigh in on statute compatibility with
fundamental law.1 67 While the Act has been criticized for the omission of the
remedies portion of the Convention in its incorporation (potentially for fear of more
wide-ranging judicial encroachment),168  the Act's "strong interpretive
obligation' 16 1 to interpret statutes in light of the Act has the effect of constraining
the executive by making draft orders and other secondary legislation subject o
supranational authority, and the political effect of forcing Parliament to expend
political capital in explicitly overruling the judiciary if it objects.
D. British Constitutional Law as Applied to Executive Order Three
In imagining a hypothetical Prime Minister Trump (of UKIP perhaps, for
the sake of illustration), we see the new Prime Minister quickly encounter some
brakes on his authority by way of Cabinet authority and political pressure.
Supposing the Prime Minister desired to enact the precise text of his first executive
order, he would not be able to do so directly. 170 Instead, he would necessarily work
through the Secretary for the Home Office, who in turn supervises the Minister of
State for Immigration.171 While the Prime Minister is fully capable of directing
policy orientation in proposed delegated legislation as head of the party in power,
(in the case of the first executive order: review of information sharing, denying
access from specific countries, etc.), the department with which the Minister
oversees (UK Visas and Immigration) would have the delegated responsibility for
163 Human Rights Act 1998, § 1 (Arts. 2-12 & 14 of the Convention, Arts. 1-3 of the
First Protocol, and Art. 1 of the Thirteenth Protocol).
164 See generally Eur. Conv. on H.R. [ECHR], 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (Nov. 4, 1950),
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention ENG.pdf.
156 Human Rights Act 1998, § 3.
166 Id. § 4.
167 See supra note 161.
168 WADHAM, ET AL., BLACKSTONE'S GuIDE TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 17-18
(4th ed. 2007).
169 Id. at 8.
70 What is Secondary Legislation, PARLIAMENT.UK, http://www.parliament.uk/about
/how/laws/delegated/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2019) (outlining the process by which delegated
legislation is enacted, specifically that delegated legislation in the common form of a
statutory instrument is typically drafted by the department overseeing the policy) [hereinafter
What is Secondary Legislation].
171 See Ministers, Ministers by Department, Home Office, GOV.UK,
https://www.gov.uk/government/ministers (last visited Feb. 27, 2019); Ministerfor State for
Security and Immigration, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/ministers/minister-for-
security-and-immigration (last visited Feb. 27, 2019).
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drafting a policy, circulating it in the Cabinet, and presenting any delegated
legislation before Parliament for approval or disapproval. 17 2 Depending on the
office holder, severe drafting errors akin to those included in the first executive
order issued by President Trump would be less likely.173 The accompanying inter-
executive information sharing problems would be even less likely as the one
overseeing the implementation of a policy is the official who drafted, circulated,
and is ultimately responsible before Parliament for that same policy.174 Even
supposing the appointee to that particular position under a Trump government is
less than competent, the draft order itself would be drafted by civil servants with
policy experience and who continue in their positions irrespective of changes in
government.175  The power to draft (and therefore shape) initial secondary
legislation is highly dispersed to unelected officials and other ministers in the
British system; as a result of this diffusion, any drafted legislation would be unlikely
to suffer the defects of an executive order drafted by unequipped policy advisors.
Additional pressure would be political in nature. As noted above, a
Cabinet uneasy with the decisions of the Prime Minister may resign and prompt a
leadership challenge. Even if our hypothetical Prime Minister Trump were to
successfully implement, or even advocate for a policy in the form of a command
paper,176 the resignation of a disgruntled cabinet official who is blindsided by an
incompetent draft could prematurely bring down a Trump government as has
happened with even the most well-positioned Prime Ministers. 177 Furthermore, the
Prime Minister would likely face some measure of opposition from the House of
Lords whose membership is politically adroit, scarcely subject to popular pressure,
172 CABINET OFFICE, MINISTERIAL CODE, 2016 §§ 2.3-2.6,
http://www.civilservant.org.uk/library/2016 ministerial code.pdf [hereinafter MINISTERIAL
CODE].
173 Compare Minister without Portfolio: The Rt Hon Brandon Lewis MP, Gov.uK,
https://www.gov.uk/government/people/brandon-lewis (last visited Dec. 18, 2017). The
current office holder for the Conservatives, the Rt. Hon. Brandon Lewis, MP holds a
bachelor's of science in Economic and LLB (Hons.) from the University of Buckingham,
and an LLM in commercial law from King's College, London; and has served in various
other government positions, with Glenn Thrush & Maggie Haberman, Trump and Staff
Rethink Tactics after Stumbles, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/20 17/02/05/us/politics/trump-white-house-aides-strategy.html
(reporting that no review process constrained White House policy advisors Stephen Miller
and Steve Bannon who oversaw the drafting of the travel ban - neither of whom hold a law
degree).
174 MINISTERIAL CODE, supra note 172.
175 See BRADLEY & EwNG, supra note 127, at 299; see also What is Secondary
Legislation, supra note 170 ("Statutory Instruments (Sis) are documents drafted by a
government department to make changes to the law." [emphasis added]).
176 Essentially a document stating official government policy. See Government
publications (Command Papers), PARLIAMENTUK,
http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/publications/government/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2017).
177 LEYLAND, supra note 136, at 162-63.
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and capable of blocking both primary and secondary legislation to a degree.178 In
truth, one of the primary functions of the House of Lords is to ensure the legality of
legislation.179 In each instance, power-sharing among legislative branch members
reduces the likelihood of shocking or deficient legislation being enacted.
The final backstop to such legislation would be the judiciary. A deficient
item of secondary legislation can be either narrowly construed or deemed ultra
vires.180 Supposing the text of the first executive order were enacted as secondary
legislation, the UK Supreme Court may find it to be an illegal action based on its
own precedent on the grounds that it: (1) violates the principle of legal certainty in
not clearly giving a timeline for implementation;1 81 or (2) is ultra vires per the
statutory authorization of the order in question.182 Alternatively, presuming the
order contravenes a European Union obligation per the Human Rights Act 1998,
the Court may make a declaration of incompatibility and wait for Parliament to
address it again at a later point.183 However, it should be pointed out that this action
by the Court would not prevent Parliament from enacting and enforcing a poorly
written bill, or one ostensibly motivated by animus. Ultimately, the power granted
to the judiciary is just so: granted, and therefore limited if a Prime Minister-via
Parliament-is truly determined to pass agiven law.
178 However, one should note the purpose served by the House is not equivalent to that
of the United States Senate as merely another legislative body with membership being the
only difference (though this has been the aim of some unsuccessful party efforts to effect).
See BRADLEY & EWING, supra note 127, at 215-218. The primary purpose served is to offer
amendments to improve legislation, and that per the Parliament Acts of 1911 and 1949, there
are two exceptions to the necessity of consent by the House of Lords for royal assent: 1)
where a public bill is endorsed as a money bill and has not been passed by the Lords after a
month; and 2) where the Lords have refused to pass a bill in two successive legislative
sessions after approval by the House of Commons. Id. at 213. An instance of the second
procedure's use given by Bradley & Ewing is the 1991 royal assent of the War Crimes Bill
after two successive legislative sessions of blocking by the House of Lords. Id. at 215.
179 House of Lords: Making laws, PARLLIMENT.UK, http://www.parliament.uk/
business/lords/work-of-the-house-of-lords/making-laws/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2018) ("The
Lords plays an essential role in improving bills, highlighting problems and making them
workable.").
"0 See generally R. v. Lord Chancellor.
181 See R. (on the Application of Reilly and another) v. Sec. for Work and Pensions
[2013] UKSC 68 47, on appeal from [2013] EWCA Civ 95 (quoting Scott, LJ Blackpool
Corp. v. Locker [1948] 1 KB 349, 362).
182 See R. v. Lord Chancellor, at 23.
183 See R. (on the application of Nickelson and another) v. Ministry of Justice [2014]
UKSC 38 38, on appeal from [2013] EWCA Civ 961.
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E. Conclusions on British Constitutional Law
As noted above, most ofwhat makes predicting a Trump-style government
action in the United Kingdom difficult is the degree to which the British
constitutional order relies on unwritten rules and norms that are not enforceable by
a stronger form of judicial review, and that can be entirely dispensed with by
legislation. Over the past decade, the United Kingdom has seen significant changes
in the distribution of power, but in each instance, the only locus of government
necessary to enact these changes has been the same: Parliament. A constitutional
order built on tradition and parliamentary sovereignty would seem to remain
ultimately political despite various moves toward an independent judiciary and
codified human rights law.184 Barring a move toward truly Marbury-style review
(where the UK Supreme Court could declare primary legislation unenforceable),
even if one recognizes all the political pressure that may be brought to bear against
a badly behaving cabinet secretary or prime minister, if we were to translate the
Trumpian political moment into the United Kingdom along with an executive order,
a UKIP government could really do as it pleased regarding immigration policy-if
not by delegated legislation, then by primary legislation. While a strong and
independent civil service can guard against badly drafted policy papers, and the
courts can guard against ultra vires secondary acts, neither they nor any other power
in the United Kingdom could overrule an Act of Parliament curtailing immigration
in a racially or religiously suspect way. Even if a protectionist immigration policy
were correctly drafted so as to be decipherable by the courts and workable by
agencies, the lack ofjudicial review regarding constitutional validity means that no
recourse is afforded to those who would denied entry as a result of authorizing
legislation. The most an opponent could hope for is a repeal following the next
election-little different from the hope of any real-life Trump opponent concerning
his executive orders, but with the problematic language having the power of
legislation and lacking the hope ofjudicial review.
This is by no means to say that a UKIP or any similar government is in
anyway a political possibility, but one might caution that an innately historical
constitution that relies on unwritten rules and norms of behavior may be severely
tested in a profoundly ahistorical moment. In attempting to balance
maneuverability with restraint against a blindly populist movement, the UK
Constitution relies on parliamentary supremacy to ensure popular government and
accountability for all policy choices. This works well in a political climate where
norms are respected and the people at large consent to their utility in a general sense.
184 BOGDANOR, supra note 124, at 19 ("The old constitution, then, was a political
constitution, in that its character was determined by events rather than pre-existing
constitutional norms."). Bogdanor later describes some of the changing aspects of the
Constitutional order that we have discussed so far as putting Britain on the path toward "a
fully codified constitution." Id. at 215. Given that a number of his predicted reforms have not
yet materialized, it is fair to say that the British Constitution remains a fundamentally
political one. Even if that state of being is on its way out the door, ours is the analysis one
must make if conducting contemporary comparative analysis.
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However, in a climate of discontent, the absence of judicial review will leave no
clear backstop against a Parliament that is determined to overrule what some would
consider individual rights or propriety in government.
IV. FRENCH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND SEPARATION OF
POWERS
The French Constitution of 1958 is the highest order of law governing the
Fifth Republic of France.185 Adopted after over 20 failed coalition governments
under the parliamentary supremacy of the Fourth Republic, a primary distinction of
the new Constitution was the granting of substantial power to an independent-
executive President apart from the Prime Minister.18 6 Intentionally distinct from
the British vision of blurred executive and legislative powers,187 the key framer of
the Constitution, General Charles de Gaulle, sought to keep the new republic's
government from becoming "no more than a collection of delegations" responding
to the interests of Parliament.188 Therefore, the Fifth Republic is a semi-presidential
system: there is both a Parliament headed by a Prime Minister who can be replaced
with a vote of no-confidence, and a popularly elected President with separate
powers.189 These powers include the exclusive ability of the President to legislate
by decree in policy areas that are not enumerated in Article 34 of the Constitution
by rkglement.1 90 This power-sharing arrangement is distinct from the British system
not only in that it is constrained by the text of the Constitution, but also because
these powers are independent, rather than derivative of each other. 191 This is
115 CATHERINE ELLIOT & CATHERINE VERNON, FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 31 (2000); see
generally 1958 CONST. pmbl. (Fr.).
186 ELLIOT& VERNON, supra note 185, at 9.
7 And more to the point, distinct from the Fourth Republic's problematic tendency
for either chamber to withdraw confidence from the government by a simple majority vote.
See JOHN BELL ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAW 141 (1998).
188 ELLIOT & VERNON, supra note 185, at 12.
189 Cindy Skatch, The Newest Separation of Powers: Semipresidentialism, 5 INT'L J.
CONST. L. 93, 93 (2007).
190 1958 CONST. art. 37 (Fr.). Additionally, under article 38, the government has the
ability to ask Parliament for authority to authorize decrees within those domains as well,
called ordonance. These are adopted by the President's cabinet, but must be subject to an
opinion by the Conseil d'Etat and laid before Parliament for approval within the timeframe
required by the authorizing legislation. Id. art. 38. See ELLIOT & VERNON, supra note 185, at
47. These are therefore much more akin to similarly delegated legislation found in our
discussion of British Constitutional Law: executive action with ratification by the legislature.
See supra Part III.
191 Skatch, supra note 189, at 96. ("The most critical feature of semipresidentialism is
the additional separation of powers that comes with the division of the executive into two
independently legitimized and constitutionally powerful institutions...").
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necessary in the French system as there is no crown from which power to legislate
originates. 92
A. Development and Scope of French Executive and Judicial Power
Despite this separation, the President holds substantial power over
Parliament, having the ability to appoint the Prime Minister. 193 Naturally, the power
of Parliament to pass a motion of censure constrains his choice to a member capable
of commanding a majority,194 but that power by itself ensures that "Prime Ministers
derive their powers from the President and not from Parliament."'1 95 This leads to
the tendency of Prime Ministers resigning upon disagreement with the President on
policy grounds that the government intends to pursue.196 The Government
(comprised of the Council of Ministers, who oversee various government
departments, and the President, and frequently referred to as the Cabinet) retains
the ability to regulate by decree in areas that are not listed under the domain of
Parliament, and to amend an Act that addresses those domains. 197 While this is a
more expansive view of executive authority than what is present in separation of
powers regimes like that of the United States, not only does the number of listed
domains limit the utility of this presidential power, but principles ofjudicial review
addressed later automatically arise in issuing regulations by decree.198 In the
192 Compare BELL ET AL., supra note 187, at 14 ("Echoing article 2 of the Declaration
of the Rights of Man and Citizen, article 2 of the 1958 Constitution makes clear that legal
sovereignty resides in the people.") and BELL ET AL., supra note 187, at 20-22 (discussing
the theoretical and practical decline of parliamentary sovereignty in France) with DICEY,
supra note 125, at 11 (discussing the residual monarchist theory behind the British
Parliament's power). As power arises from the people, there is no need to trace power to
anything other than "a republican pedigree," which is the practice of the Conseil
constitutionnel. BELL ET AL., supra note 187, at 17.
193 1958 CONST. art. 8 (Fr.).
194 ELLIOT & VERNON, supra note 185, at 17.
195 Id.
196 BELL ET AL., supra note 187, at 144-45.
197 1958 CONST. arts. 34, 37 (Fr.). Commentators have also noted that the distinction
between parliamentary loi and rkglement, at least insofar as parliament's legislation beyond
the bounds of art. 34, is not impermeable. L. NEVILLE BROWN & J.F. GARNER, FRENCH
ADMTmLSTRAT1VE LAW 12 (3d ed. 1983).
'9' Fr. 1958 Const. art. 37; see also L. NEVILLE BROWN & JOHN S. BELL, FRENCH
ADMWNLSTRATVE LAW 11 (4th ed. 1993) (stating that Constitutional requirements for a loi to
state principles and rules over a large range of areas coupled with the trend toward
declassification (where the Conseil constitutionnel reviews whether or not an act of
Parliament exceeds its art. 34 authority-frequently finding that it does not) both serve to
limit executive regulatory authority). But see BELL ET AL., supra note 187, at 21 (noting
concerning the division between loi and rkglement, "[W]hile Parliament is limited to the list,
the legislative power of the Government consists of all the rest. The executive appears to be
seriously advantaged by this divide.").
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immigration context, "nationality, status, and the legal capacity of persons" is a
domain of Parliament under Article 34.199 Beyond this, Parliament may also pass
legislation enabling the President to regulate by ordonannce, areas of policy
ordinarily reserved to it under Article 34.200 However, such decrees must be first
adopted by the Cabinet and then counter-signed by the Prime Minister, and are
automatically subject to judicial review, albeit by a different body than ordinary
decrees.201 Insofar as Acts of Parliament are concerned: once nacted, as in Britain,
there is no judicial recourse.
20 2
Next, we turn to the two courts that have some form of jurisdiction over
constitutional questions concerning rkglement and ordonannce: the Conseil d'Etat
and the Conseil constitutionnel. Before discussing the cases themselves, one should
note that the value given to precedent in civil law countries like France is distinct
from that in common law nations-precedent cannot formally bind courts making
later decisions concerning legislation.20 3 This principle arose in the context of the
French Revolution as a reaction to the former abuse of stare decisis by judges during
the monarchy.20 4 This practice protecting the power of the legislature and executive
from the judiciary has persisted in some form to the Fifth Republic .205 This has
resulted in a short and syllogistic format categorizing most French decisions,
relying heavily on the language of the statute in question .206 The Conseil d'Etat
and Conseil constitutionnel each make several exceptions to these rules that are
discussed below.
The Conseil d'Etat is the highest administrative law court in the Fifth
Republic.207 Commentators have noted two areas ofjurisdiction that are of interest
to us here: actions taken by members of Parliament to annul a government decree
199 1958 CONST. art. 34 (Fr.).
200 ELLIOT & VERNON, supra note 185, at 47. The act enabling such regulation must
contain time limitations in which the President may produce the ordonannces and the time
by which Parliament must approve them.
201 Id. at 47-48. Additionally, art. 92 of the original constitution granted the
government the power to set up institutions necessary for the health and safety of the French
people. Authors note that his provision was repeatedly abused and repealed in 1995. Id.
202 BROWN & BELL, supra note 198, at 12.
203 EVA STEINER, FRENCH LEGAL METHOD 82 (2002).
204 Id. at 77-78; BROWN & BELL, supra note 198, at 166-67 (noting that while the
Conseil d'Etat produces caselaw as a common law court does, the principle of stare decisis
does not apply and the conseil may depart freely from its precedent); ELLIOT & VERNON,
supra note 185, at 51-52 (specifically noting that judges in the post-Revolutionary period
could be fined or barred from performing their function by relying on precedent in lieu of
codified law).
205 STERNER, supra note 203, at 131-32 (noting again the distinction between the
deductive reasoning of civil law systems like France and the concrete-ness of common law
jurisdictions).
206 ELLIOT & VERNON, supra note 185, at 111.
207 See id. at 6.
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or ordonnance, and proceedings to challenge particular administrative acts.20 8
Additionally, the Conseil must advise Parliament concerning every loi (literally,
"law") presented to it by the government.209 Furthermore, the Conseil is similar to
a common law court in that almost all administrative law over which it has
jurisdiction is judge-made law, but with the twist that this law is persuasive
authority, owing to the rejection of stare decisis.
210
The Conseil constitutionnel, operates in a manner distinct from both the
US and British systems: like the US system, the Conseil passes on the
constitutionality of the loi presented before it, with an offending statute being
ineligible for promulgation and enforcement.211 However, much like the British
system, while its judgments and rationale are considered authoritative among
courts, there are limitations on the power of the court-most apparent is the inability
to contest a statute's constitutionality after it has been promulgated.
212
Additionally, the French system is unique as only certain persons in government
may ask the Conseil to determine the constitutionality of a loi.2 13 Supposing that a
law has not been challenged before being promulgated, there is no recourse by
individual citizens to the Consei.214 Given its limited purview, it is questionable
whether the Conseil constitutionnel is in fact a constitutional court in the usual sense
of the term.
215
B. French Judicial Review and Individual Rights
To understand the effect of a Trump-like French presidency, one must also
address the treatment of individual rights, particularly religion, in French law.
Unlike the Preamble to the US Constitution, the French Constitution's Preamble
serves a legal purpose: to incorporate two other foundational sources of law in the
Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789 and the Preamble to the
Constitution of 1946 as providing constitutional norms. 216 Thus, while courts
adjudicate matters of statute, the courts also take into account general principles of
French law including that of la'fcit , or official state secularism.
217 This form of
208 BROWN & BELL, supra note 198 at, 51-52.
209 Id. at 61 (also noting that Parliament need not countenance the advice).
2 10 BROWN & BELL, supra note 198, at 166-67; STErNER, supra note 203, at 82
(discussing factors giving weight to particular decisions).
211 ELLIOT & VERNON, supra note 185, at 94.
212 Id. at 97.
213 Id. at 96. Listing the President, Prime Minister, the Presidents of the National
Assembly and Senate, and 60 Members of Parliament, including opposition members. Elliot
& Vernon note that the number of cases heard by the Conseil in this way is fairly substantial
given the access by opponents of the government.
214 ELLIOT & VERNON, supra note 185, at 97.
215 Id. at 90-91.
216 BELLET AL., supra note 187, at 16-18.
217 1958 CONST. art. 1 (Fr.).
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separation of church and state, as well as commitment to a secular public square,
constitutes a far more consistent and culturally salient variety than its US
counterpart.218 Its relationship to the present subject of controversy in particular,
Islam, has impacted public education,219 public accommodation,22 and what in the
United States would be considered symbolic speech in the public square.221 In each
instance (except in Cannes), the principle of public French secularism has permitted
the majority to restrict the religious expression of the minority where, "a
conciliation which is not manifestly disproportionate" between freedom of religion
and the safety of the Republic is made.222 The acceptance of this legislation despite
the apparent aim of targeting a particular religious practice would seem to make
judicial review to animus-motivated legislation unlikely where the text is facially
neutral.
223
However, a constitutional hurdle is present to any complete r striction on
petitions for asylum. The incorporated Preamble to the 1946 Constitution includes
a provision guaranteeing the right to asylum to "[a]ny man persecuted in virtue of
his actions in favour of liberty. 22 4 Actions by the government have been held
unconstitutional for presenting hurdles to the exercise of this right.225 However, in
so doing, the Conseil has acknowledged that "the State is entitled to define the
conditions of admission of foreigners to its territory subject to the respect of the
218 Compare J. CHRISTOPHER SOPER ET AL., THE CHALLENGE OF PLURALISM: CHURCH
AND STATE IN Six DEMOCRACIS 12 (3d ed. 2017) with id. at 52.
219 JANE FREEDMAN, IMMIGRATION AND INSECURITY IN FRANCE 127-141 (2004)
(discussing the Affaire des foulards, where the exclusion of headscarf wearing girls from a
secular school prompted a controversy as to whether their continued use of such clothing
constituted, "a sign of failure of the French Republican system to fully assimilate second and
third generation immigrants into French society.").
220 SOPER ET AL., supra note 218, at 51 (discussing the decision of the mayor of
Cannes, France to ban the wearing of full-body swimsuits on the beach, though suspended
by the Conseil d'Etat).
22 1 Loi 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans
l'espace public [Law 2010-1192 of October 11, 2010 Act prohibiting concealment of the face
in public space], Journal Officiel de la Rdpublique Fran~aise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of
France], Oct. 12, 2010, p. 18345 (prohibiting any person from wearing a covering that is
intended to conceal the face).
222 Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision no. 2010-613DC,
Oct. 7, 2010 (Fr.).
223 SOPER ET AL., supra note 218, at 65 ("But the [face covering] ban is widely
perceived as targeting the practice of some Muslim women who wear the niqab, burqa, or
other masking clothing.).
224 1946 CONST. pmbl. § 4. (Fr.).
225 Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision no. 92-307DC, Feb.
25, 1992, Rec. 48 (Fr.) ("[I]t follows that by conferring on the administrative authority the
power to maintain a foreigner permanently in a transit zone without reserving the possibility
for the judicial authority to intervene as soon as possible. . . [is] contrary to the
Constitution.").
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international commitments it has subscribed and the principles of constitutional
value.-
226
Insofar as administrative action is concerned, judicial review by the
Conseil d'Etat plays a much more important role in both a substantive and symbolic
sense. As immigration advocates have noted, litigation before the Conseil is not
competent to actually overturn enacted legislation.227 Nevertheless the Conseil can
"review all applications of the law, from ministerial decisions to street-level
bureaucrats.'228 Additionally, while some writers have noted the eminent symbolic
value of victorious litigation at the level of the Conseil,229 it should also be noted
that the characteristically syllogistic decisions of the court do not generally provide
guidance based on broad human rights themes.230 In discussing any case, "from the
text of the decision alone, it is impossible to know the legal reasoning by which the
Conseil d'Etat deduced this result.
231
C. Conclusions on French Constitutional Law
In examining the structure of the French Constitution in isolation, there is
much to commend it for in the administrative context. While the ability of the
executive to legislate by decree or ordonnance is broad, it is checked by the
institutional ability of a minority party to challenge its constitutionality through the
Conseil constitutionnel and by the threat of a vote of no-confidence.
23 2
Administrative action is likewise reviewed and overturned where statutory law,
interpreted through the Conseil d'Etat, requires.233  Yet there is no surplus of
judicial review as Parliament may still do as it pleases if no party objects, and in
selecting a Prime Minister, the President still holds a powerful lever in making even
a divided government productive.
Nevertheless, no constitution really operates in isolation. Two factors in
particular make French separation of powers constraints especially problematic in
the immigration context. The first is the power of the French presidency over the
mechanisms of Parliament. The French President possesses a number of tools for
regulation by which a poorly drafted measure or regulation that violates
fundamental rights may be promulgated. In the context of immigration, the
President's unilateral power is naturally limited given that nationality is a legislative
domain under Article 34.234 However, the ability to choose a compliant Prime
226 Id.
227 LEILA KAWAR, CONTESTING IMMIGRATION POLICY IN COURT 130-31 (2015).
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 130.
231 Id. at 137.
232 See generally supra notes 211-213.
233 See generally supra notes 207-210.
234 1958 CONST. art. 34 (Fr.).
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Minister or to dissolve Parliament per Article 12 gives the President enormous
leverage to push for popular measures and to force Parliament to confront voters if
they fail to act. Thus, even if an Act of Parliament (or an Article 37 delegation)
does not contain the errors attendant in unreviewed executive action, a President
may use the dissolution power in an attempt to compel Parliament to grant delegated
power or to act in a manner that is contrary to individual rights.
The second difficulty is laicit. The strong-form state secularism present
in France2 35 renders judicial protection unlikely for individuals who receive
disparate treatment because of the majority religion of their country of origin. This
is particularly the case where the difference in treatment need only satisfy a "not
manifestly disproportionate" standard.2 36 Therefore, regarding fundamental rights
protections, it is unlikely that the Conseil constitutionnel would prove sympathetic
to claims akin to those raised by plaintiffs in the US travel ban cases above, and it
is therefore less likely to check excesses. While this is properly a critique of the
French conception of fundamental rights, in our context, the inability of a court to
intervene with respect to an individual executive action on such grounds implicates
the French separation of powers by indirectly conferring more power to the
executive by removing a potential backstop.
In attempting to compensate for the parliamentary discord of the Fourth
Republic, the modem French Constitution gives substantial power to the executive
while allowing for ample room for facially legitimate legislation that takes aim at
minority religions. Admittedly, the separation between President and Prime
Minister places distance between a hypothetical French President Trump and the
type of regulatory power wielded by any given British Prime Minister. This is in
addition to the review available for ordonnances by the Conseil d'Etat.
Furthermore, the rule of parliamentary supremacy is somewhat blunted by the
availability of judicial review on request by the Conseil constitutionnel. However,
the ability of the President to regulate all areas not overseen by Parliament; the
capacity to pick the Prime Minister and to dissolve Parliament; and the cultural
antipathy toward public religion reflected in Conseil constitutionnel decisions give
substantial room for a potential Front Nationale President o act in an animus-driven
manner. In France, the potential for a repeat of a US executive order is far more
politically viable than in Britain,2 37 and it bears consideration whether the
moderation of a semi-presidential system is sufficient to guide the executive to
balanced action.
V. CONCLUSION
A comparison of the US separation of powers regime with that of the
United Kingdom and France yields several insights into the proper balance between
235 SOPER ET AL., supra note 218, at 52.
236 Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision no. 2010-613DC,
Oct. 7, 2010 (Fr.).
237 Compare polls cited supra, notes 5-6.
Evaluating Separation of Powers Regimes
restraint of the executive and fluid decision-making. The primary insight is that a
lack of strong-form judicial review places both the United Kingdom and France at
risk of seeing rapid or ill-considered changes of policy with no recourse by affected
citizens even where fundamental rights are threatened by executive action. The
United Kingdom is made vulnerable by the nearly unlimited power that the Prime
Minister exercises in guiding policy that is essentially unimpeachable thanks to
parliamentary sovereignty. While this commingling of executive and legislative
authority does enable quick responses to national emergencies, it is unencumbered
by any judicial restraint that could conform such action to fundamental values. To
be fair, the advantage of a strong, independent civil service does somewhat mitigate
the chance of harm from poorly drafted executive rulemaking, and the ultra vires
doctrine could be invoked again. However, that hardly removes the damage that
can be done through Acts of Parliament that, in other respects, are technically
sufficient but motivated by animus and popular sentiment.
The French system does provide further safeguards in the form of a
separate President and Prime Minister; however, this particular semi-presidential
system poses risks by giving substantial rulemaking power to executive where
legislative authority does not extend. In the immigration context, where Parliament
is competent to act, a President may use their inherent power to choose a Prime
Minister or to dissolve Parliament o face an election in order to pressure an
otherwise reluctant legislative branch to adopt unwise policy on the basis of a rapid
change in public opinion. Again, while the Conseil d'Etat can invoke ultra vires
when an ordonannce that is the result of delegated power is questioned, neither it
nor an individual who is disadvantaged by legislation that is not ruled
unconstitutional by the Conseil constitutionnel has any further recourse. Given the
legal consequences of French public secularism discussed above, intervention by
the latter court is unlikely in cases where legislation is passed based on animus.
Despite the initial confusion of the executive order issued by President
Trump, the power of strong judicial review subjected a questionable executive
action to over a year of extensive litigation, and also prompted revision of orders
that were embedded with significant technical flaws. While this necessarily
dampened the ability of the executive to respond rapidly to changing circumstances,
it places a significant backstop on the ability of any given president to enact animus-
motivated executive action. While the length of litigation is certainly not ideal in
an emergency, the alternatives of mixed power and little judicial review (or rank
majoritarian fiat) would seem to sacrifice most individual rights protections for the
sake of expediency. The trade-off by the United Kingdom and France is not ideal,
particularly in scenarios wherein popular pressure makes political branch protection
of minorities untenable. This does not preclude all rapid executive action in the
face of emergency. As Justice Jackson points out in his Youngstown concurring
opinion, "we already have evolved a technique within the framework of the
Constitution by which normal executive powers may be considerably expanded to
meet an emergency," namely grants of Congressional authority to the President.238
238 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 652 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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This coupled with judicial oversight allows the balance of expediency and rights
protection to be better realized than under systems whereby ill-considered or ill-
intended executive force may stretch out its hand against individuals by way of
parliamentary supremacy or semi-presidential pressure.
